Convex games versus clan games

Rodica Branzei, Dinko Dimitrov and Stef Tijs
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Rodica Branzei: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Stef Tijs: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 381, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each monotonic convex game generates a total clan game with zero worth for the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of the Weber set of the corresponding games.

Keywords: Weber set; Core; Marginal games; Total clan games; Convex games; Dual games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-15
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315634/2319820 First Version, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: CONVEX GAMES VERSUS CLAN GAMES (2008)
Working Paper: Convex Games versus Clan Games (2006)
Working Paper: Convex Games versus Clan Games (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:381

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