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A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO QUEUE ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE OBJECTS

Herbert Hamers (), Flip Klijn, Marco Slikker and Bas van Velzen ()
Additional contact information
Herbert Hamers: Center and Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, P. O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Bas van Velzen: Center and Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, P. O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 02, 215-227

Abstract: We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Keywords: Indivisible objects; queue; cooperative game theory; JEL Classification: C71; JEL Classification: D61; JEL Classification: D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198909002273
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (2004) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002273

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