A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects

Herbert Hamers, Marco Slikker, Bas Van Velzen and Flip Klijn

No 221, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Keywords: Indivisible objects; queue; cooperative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D61 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO QUEUE ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE OBJECTS (2009)
Working Paper: A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (2004)
Working Paper: A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (2004)
Working Paper: A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:221

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