BARGAINING OVER LOSSES

Jayson Lusk and Darren Hudson

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2010, vol. 12, issue 01, 83-91

Abstract: We introduce a modified version of the Ultimatum game where people bargain over losses instead of gains. Results show that when people bargain over losses, they make more aggressive offers, in terms of their own monetary well-being, as compared to when they bargained over gains.

Keywords: Bargaining; loss aversion; negative ultimatum bargaining game; Subject Classification: 91A90; Subject Classification: 91B99; Subject Classification: 91C99; Subject Classification: 91A05; Subject Classification: 91A10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002532

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