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Giuseppe De Marco and Jacqueline Morgan ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2011, vol. 13, issue 04, 363-381

Abstract: This paper studies new refinement concepts for correlated equilibria based on altruistic behavior of the players and generalizes some refinement concepts previously developed by the authors for Nash equilibria. Effectiveness of the concepts, relations with the corresponding notions for Nash equilibria and with other correlated equilibrium refinements are investigated. The analysis of the topological properties of the set of solutions concludes the paper.

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; refinement; altruistic behavior; friendliness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Altruistic Behavior and Correlated Equilibrium Selection (2010) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198911003118

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