Altruistic Behavior and Correlated Equilibrium Selection
Giuseppe De Marco and
Jacqueline Morgan ()
CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy
This paper studies new refinement concepts for correlated equilibria based on altruistic behavior of the players and which generalize some refinement concepts introduced by the authors in previous papers for Nash equilibria. Effectiveness of the concepts, relations with the corresponding notions for Nash equilibria and with other correlated equilibrium refinements are investigated. The analysis of the topological properties of the set of solutions concludes the paper.
Keywords: correlated equilibrium; altruistic behavior; refinement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in International Game Theory Review, 2011, Vol. 13, 363-381.
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Journal Article: ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR AND CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:269
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