On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games

Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2015, vol. 17, issue 04, 1-7

Abstract: We show that the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.

Keywords: NTU game; convex game; bargaining set; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games (2015)
Working Paper: On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games (2014)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198915500085

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