On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games
Bezalel Peleg and
Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
We show that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.
Keywords: NTU game; Convex game; Bargaining set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Forthcoming in IGTR's Volume 17, Issue 4.
Published in IGTR's Volume 17, Issue 4, Pages 1-7.
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Journal Article: On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games (2015)
Working Paper: On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp681
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