How Elections are Impacted by Production, Economic Growth and Conflict

Kjell Hausken and Mthuli Ncube ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2016, vol. 18, issue 01, 1-29

Abstract: We analyze the pre- and post-election processes as a two-period game between an incumbent and a challenger. Before the election, in period 1, an incumbent allocates resources into production, fighting with the challenger, and providing public goods, which impact the probability of winning an election. After the election, in period 2 the incumbent may accept the election result, or a coalition or standoff may follow. Six outcomes are that the incumbent wins, the challenger wins, and that a standoff or coalition arises after one of the players wins. We analyze the incumbent’s and challenger’s strategic choices, how these choices depend on a variety of parameters, and the impact of the choices. The analysis is mapped to and tested against empirics of 48 African elections during 2009–2015 which are classified into the six outcomes. To test the model empirically, the correlations between three variables (the incumbent’s fighting and public goods provision and the challenger’s fighting, in period 1) and the six election outcomes are determined for 48 African elections.

Keywords: Election; fighting; production; risk; game; conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198915500152

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