How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree?

Emily Tanimura () and Sylvie Thoron
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Emily Tanimura: Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, University of Paris 1, 106-112 bld de l’hopital, 75013, Paris, France

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2016, vol. 18, issue 03, 1-17

Abstract: We propose a new noncooperative approach to implement a cooperative bargaining solution. This approach relies on a mechanism which specifies what happens when, at the end of the bargaining phase, players’ propositions are still not compatible. The mechanism uses a random lottery and the history of proposals. At equilibrium, under the threat of this mechanism, provided that the use of it carries a small cost, players reach consensus after a finite number of proposals. No discounting is needed. The equilibrium strategies implement the full Raiffa bargaining process and players agree on a solution arbitrarily close to the Raiffa solution.

Keywords: Noncooperative bargaining theory; Raiffa bargaining solution; risk aversion; outside option; disagreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? (2016)
Working Paper: How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? (2016)
Working Paper: How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? (2016)
Working Paper: How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? (2016)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198916500080

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