How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree?

Emily Tanimura () and Sylvie Thoron
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Emily Tanimura: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We propose a new non-cooperative approach to implement a cooperative bargaining solution. This approach relies on a mechanism which specifies what happens when, at the end of the bargaining phase, players' propositions are still not compatible. The mechanism uses a random lottery and the history of proposals. At equilibrium, under the threat of this mechanism, provided that the use of it carries a small cost, players reach consensus after a finite number of proposals. No discounting is needed. The equilibrium strategies implement the full Raiffa bargaining process and players agree on a solution arbitrarily close to the Raiffa solution.

Keywords: non-cooperative bargaining theory; Raiffa bargaining solution; risk aversion; outside option; disagreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01704885
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in International Game Theory Review, 2016

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Related works:
Journal Article: How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? (2016)
Working Paper: How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? (2016)
Working Paper: How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? (2016)
Working Paper: How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01704885

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