Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

Ayşe Mumcu and Ismail Saglam

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2021, vol. 23, issue 02, 1-12

Abstract: We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of [Roth, A. E. [1982] The economics of matching: Stability and incentives, Math. Oper. Res. 7(4), 617–628] obtained in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show that there are no limits on successful manipulation of preferences by coalitions of men and women, in contrast with the result of [Demange, G., Gale, D. and Sotomayor, M. [1987] A further note on the stable matching problem, Discrete Appl. Math. 16(3), 217–222] obtained in the absence of externalities.

Keywords: Game theory; one-to-one matching; externalities; stability; strategic manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198920500152

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