Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

Ayşe Mumcu and Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of Roth (1982) obtained in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show that there are no limits on successful manipulation of preferences by coalitions of men and women, in contrast with the result of Demange et al. (1987) obtained in the absence of externalities.

Keywords: One-to-one matching; externalities; stability; core; strategic manipulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-12-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:97698

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