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EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS OF WEIGHTED SOCIAL NETWORKS

Wen-Bo Du (), Xian-Bin Cao (), Hao-Ran Zheng (), Hong Zhou and Mao-Bin Hu
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Wen-Bo Du: Department of Computer Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, P. R. China
Xian-Bin Cao: Department of Computer Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, P. R. China
Hao-Ran Zheng: Department of Computer Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, P. R. China
Hong Zhou: Department of Computer Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, P. R. China
Mao-Bin Hu: School of Engineering Science, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, P. R. China

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), 2009, vol. 20, issue 05, 701-710

Abstract: Much empirical evidence has shown realistic networks are weighted. Compared with those on unweighted networks, the dynamics on weighted network often exhibit distinctly different phenomena. In this paper, we investigate the evolutionary game dynamics (prisoner's dilemma game and snowdrift game) on a weighted social network consisted of rational agents and focus on the evolution of cooperation in the system. Simulation results show that the cooperation level is strongly affected by the weighted nature of the network. Moreover, the variation of time series has also been investigated. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior in the social systems.

Keywords: Evolutionary games; prisoner's dilemma game; snowdrift game; weighted complex networks; 87.23.Kg; 02.50.Le; 87.23.Ge; 89.65.-s; 89.75.Fb (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0129183109013923

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