Coevolution of synchronization and cooperation in real networks

Mingyang Zhou (), Xiaoyu Li (), Wenman Xiong () and Hao Liao
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Mingyang Zhou: Guangdong Province Key Laboratory of Popular High Performance Computers, College of Computer Science and Software Engineering & Institute of Big Data Intelligent Management and Decision, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, P. R. China
Xiaoyu Li: Guangdong Province Key Laboratory of Popular High Performance Computers, College of Computer Science and Software Engineering & Institute of Big Data Intelligent Management and Decision, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, P. R. China
Wenman Xiong: Guangdong Province Key Laboratory of Popular High Performance Computers, College of Computer Science and Software Engineering & Institute of Big Data Intelligent Management and Decision, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, P. R. China
Hao Liao: Guangdong Province Key Laboratory of Popular High Performance Computers, College of Computer Science and Software Engineering & Institute of Big Data Intelligent Management and Decision, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, P. R. China

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), 2019, vol. 30, issue 07, 1-11

Abstract: As game theory thrives in networked interactions, we usually neglect the cost of information exchange between involved individuals. Individuals may decide (or refuse) to follow the state of their neighbors, which depends on the cost of the interactions. The payoff of a node’s behavior is associated with the state difference between the node and its neighbors. Here, based on Kuramoto model, we investigate the collective behavior of different individuals in the game theory and the synchronization byproduct that is induced by the cooperation of connected nodes. Specially, we investigate the influence of network structure on the coevolutionary progress of cooperation and synchronization. We find that the networks with the higher average degree are more likely to reach synchronization in real networks. Strong synchronization is a sufficient, but not necessary condition to guarantee the cooperation. Besides, we show that synchronization is largely influenced by the average degree in both Erdös–Rényi (ER) and Barabási–Albert (BA) networks, which is also illustrated by theoretical analysis.

Keywords: Kuramoto synchronization; cooperation; game theory; complex network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1142/S0129183119400126

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