The evolution of extortion strategy in the kagome lattice

Qian Zhao, Yajun Mao and Zhihai Rong
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Qian Zhao: School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, P. R. China
Yajun Mao: School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, P. R. China
Zhihai Rong: School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, P. R. China

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), 2020, vol. 31, issue 11, 1-10

Abstract: The extortion strategy can let its surplus exceed its opponents by a fixed percentage, hence the influence of extortion strategy in a population games has drawn wide attention. In this paper, we study the evolution of extortion strategy with unconditional cooperation and unconditional defection strategies in the Kagome lattice with abundant triangles. Our investigation shows that the extortion strategy can act as catalysts to promote the evolution of cooperation in the networked Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Moreover, proper strength of extortion slope can improve the living environment of the cooperators, thus they enhance cooperation level in the network. Moreover, proper strength of extortion can not only enhance the cooperation level, but also delay the extinction of cooperation. The underlying overlapping triangles help individuals form cooperation cliques that play crucial roles for the evolution of cooperation in those lattices.

Keywords: Networked system; evolutionary game; cooperative behavior; zero-determinant strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1142/S0129183120501624

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