EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

How emotion type and intensity affect rumor spreading

Yanli Li, Jing Ma (), Fanshu Fang () and Yunjie Jiang ()
Additional contact information
Yanli Li: College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, P. R. China2School of Cultural Management, Communication University of China, Nanjing 211172, P. R. China
Jing Ma: College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, P. R. China
Fanshu Fang: College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, P. R. China
Yunjie Jiang: School of Health Policy and Management, Institute of Healthy Jiangsu Development, Nanjing Medical University, Nanjing 211166, P. R. China

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), 2023, vol. 34, issue 06, 1-16

Abstract: The implications and contagion effect of emotion cannot be ignored in rumor spreading. This paper sheds light on how decision makers’ (DMs) emotion type and intensity affect rumor spreading. Based on the rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) and evolutionary game theory (EGT), we construct an evolutionary game model between rumormongers (RMs) and managers (Ms) by considering emotions. We use MATLAB to simulate and reveal the influencing mechanism of DMs’ emotion type and intensity on rumor spreading. The results indicate that the DMs’ strategy choice is not only affected by their own emotion preference and intensity, but also by the other players in rumor spreading. Moreover, pessimism has a more significant influence than optimism on the stability of the evolutionary game, Ms’ emotion is more sensitive to the game results than RMs’ emotion and the emotion intensity is proportional to the evolution speed. More significantly, some earthshaking emotional thresholds are found, which can be used to predict RMs’ behavior, help Ms gain critical time to deal with rumors, and avoid the Tacitus Trap crisis. Furthermore, the evolution results fall into five categories: risk, opportunity, ideal, security and hostility. The results of this work can benefit Ms’ public governance.

Keywords: Rumor spreading; emotions; RDEU; evolutionary game; Tacitus trap (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0129183123500833
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:ijmpcx:v:34:y:2023:i:06:n:s0129183123500833

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0129183123500833

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC) is currently edited by H. J. Herrmann

More articles in International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wsi:ijmpcx:v:34:y:2023:i:06:n:s0129183123500833