Inter-group payoff transfer driven by collective reputation promotes cooperation in public goods game

Jianwei Wang (), Wenhui Dai (), Xinyi Zhang (), Jialu He, Fengyuan Yu () and Yihui Wu ()
Additional contact information
Jianwei Wang: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University Shenyang, 110819/Liaoning, P. R. China
Wenhui Dai: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University Shenyang, 110819/Liaoning, P. R. China
Xinyi Zhang: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University Shenyang, 110819/Liaoning, P. R. China
Jialu He: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University Shenyang, 110819/Liaoning, P. R. China
Fengyuan Yu: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University Shenyang, 110819/Liaoning, P. R. China
Yihui Wu: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University Shenyang, 110819/Liaoning, P. R. China

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), 2024, vol. 35, issue 01, 1-13

Abstract: How to effectively maintain costly intra-group cooperation has always been a topic of great concern in society. As we all know, inter-group competition is a constructive way to promote intra-group cooperation. Previous inter-group competition mechanisms are primarily based on the total contribution value of all individuals in the group in the current round, which ignore the historical behavior of the group and its members. For comparison, we argue that the introduction of collective reputation which reflects not only the total contribution of the groups in the current round but also the group’s historical behavior is necessary for the construction of an inter-group competition model. Furthermore, an excellent collective reputation can help the group obtain more high-quality resources and help the group stand out from the competition. To this end, we introduce a new mechanism of inter-group transfer payment driven by collective reputation and construct a public goods game (PGG) model of inter-group competition to study the dynamic behavior of intra-group cooperation evolution. Two parameters, the proportion of accepted groups a and the proportion of transferred groups b, are introduced. The simulation results suggest that the effectiveness of this model in promoting cooperation depends largely on the joint settings of a and b. And in most cases, the combination of small a and medium b plays the significant role.

Keywords: Public goods game; collective reputation; intra-group cooperation; inter-group competition; inter-group payoff transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0129183124500050
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:ijmpcx:v:35:y:2024:i:01:n:s0129183124500050

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0129183124500050

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC) is currently edited by H. J. Herrmann

More articles in International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().