Patents and R&D Cartels

Jacek Prokop () and Adam Karbowski

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 2018, 45-54

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to compare the impact of R&D competition (i) under patent protection and (ii) under no patent protection on enterprise innovation and performance with the impact of R&D cooperation in the form of R&D cartel on enterprise innovation and performance. For simplicity we focus on the case of duopoly. In particular, the impact of R&D competition and R&D cooperation on enterprise research investments, output, market price, company profits, consumer surplus and total social welfare was investigated. The analysis revealed that when competition is Cournot, for any level of research spillovers, the R&D investments under patent protection are smaller than in the case of no patent protection. When firms create a research cartel then, for any level of spillovers, the R&D investments will be higher than those under patent protection with Cournot competition. However, they will be higher than the R&D investments when Cournot competition takes place in the case of no patent protection only for relatively high levels of spillovers. When the level of spillovers is relatively low, the R&D investments in the case of Cournot competition with no patents are higher than in the case of research cartel formed by the duopolists.

Keywords: Patents; Cartels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O32 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Chapter: Patents and R&D Cartels (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:187770

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-70055-7_4

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().