Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages

Aleksandar Vasilev

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 2019, vol. 5, issue 2, 1-9

Abstract: The purpose of this note is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages. The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.

Keywords: indivisible labor; lotteries; unobservable effort; fair wages; insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J22 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/218943/1/Vasilev_JMEF_Winter2019.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:218943

DOI: 10.14505/jmef.v5.2(9).01

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