The impact of a gain-sharing cost-reflective tariff on waste management cost under incentive regulation: The Italian case

Giacomo Di Foggia and Massimo Beccarello

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 2020, vol. 265

Abstract: In many European countries, waste tariff systems are being updated to take account of the consolidation of circular economy objectives. We forecast the impact of a gain-sharing cost-reflective tariff on waste management sustainability. The cost-reflective tariff generates an economic surplus for society, while meeting environmental goals. Based on empirical data we developed two scenarios. The baseline scenario formalizes the current Italian tariff scheme, while the intervention scenario includes users' response to a gainsharing policy. By optimizing the tariff structure, society would benefit from a surplus that could be reached setting an asymmetric regulation based on current waste management efficiency level. Our results will potentially be a basis for directing waste management policy as per tariff design

Keywords: Environmental management; Incentive regulation; Price cap; Waste fee; Waste management; Waste policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L5 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/229163/3/preprint-jema.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The impact of a gain-sharing cost-reflective tariff on waste management cost under incentive regulation: The Italian case (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:229163

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().