Dishonesty: The role of planning, temptation, and self-control

Daniele Caliari and Ivan Soraperra

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 2025, vol. 240, No 107323, 25 pages

Abstract: Accumulated evidence shows that, when people face the opportunity to cheat, they often take it. However, it remains unclear whether this behavior reflects a genuine preference for dishonesty or a lack of self-control in the face of temptation. To address this question, we apply the temptation and self-control framework of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to cheating opportunities and experimentally test its predictions for the first time. We find that (i) only 5% of participants are willing to pay to avoid a cheating opportunity and (ii) 90% exhibit consistent planning. Specifically, those who deliberately seek out cheating opportunities exploit them (50 %), and those who do not seek out remain honest when confronted with them (40 %). This evidence suggests that temptation plays a limited role while ruling out both naivete and uncertainty about future behavior.

Keywords: Temptation and self-control; Cheating; Unethical behavior; Lab experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:334718

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107323

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