Autocratic Regime Maintenance and Phasing Out Irrigation Water Subsidies in Iran

Tinoush Jamali Jaghdani and Vasyl Kvartiuk

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 2026, vol. 68, issue 1, No 11

Abstract: This study examines subsidy retrenchment in Iran, focusing on irrigation water subsidies, the political origins of Iran’s water crisis, and the political economy of reforms. Despite significant subsidy reductions in 2010, we argue that agricultural subsidies remained due to a subsidy coalition spearheaded by constituency-embedded rural elites that leveraged electoral competition to resist cuts. Analyzing parliamentary behavior, we highlight that MPs’ decisions were swayed by agricultural elites, especially in competitive districts. These dynamics entrench underpriced irrigation inputs, lock in groundwater over-extraction, and raise the political cost of reform. This study reveals how regime maintenance, prioritizing political stability over economic efficiency, can shape policy outcomes that amplify environmental degradation.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Local elites; Subsidy retrenchment; Malapportionment; Iran (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/336861/1/41294_2026_Article_277.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:336861

DOI: 10.1057/s41294-026-00277-5

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().