Why Democracy is Essential to Monetary Stability

Stefan Homburg

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 1997, 13

Abstract: The article points out that monetary stability does not hinge upon formal central bank independence. The reason is that the legislator can easily restrict that independence by changing the law. Because the EU council as the true legislator does not face effective supervision by the citizens it is likely that it will behave as a leviathan.

Keywords: Euro; EMU (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:93250

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