Belief without Representation

Florian Klauser ()
Additional contact information
Florian Klauser: University of Ljubljana - Faculty of Education, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems - scientific journal, 2017, vol. 15, issue 4, 242-250

Abstract: In this article, I set off to explore the question "What is belief?" from a first-person perspective. Finding the explanations in analytical philosophy insufficient, I delve into the phenomenological tradition - starting with Edmund Husserl's concept of the horizon. In doing so, I find that the phenomenological tradition seems to contradict the presupposition of beliefs as representations. Directing my attention to finding an alternative explanation, I present Hubert Dreyfus' explanation of learning without representations, but show that (by Dreyfus' own admission) he does not truly take a decisive step away from representationalism. I present the idea of enaction as a proper alternative to representations. Within this new framework, I present the idea of sense-making as a potential direction towards an answer to the question at hand.

Keywords: belief; representation; phenomenology; enaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D84 Z19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://indecs.eu/2017/indecs2017-pp242-250.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zna:indecs:v:15:y:2017:i:4:p:242-250

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems - scientific journal from Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Josip Stepanic ().