Prospects and limits of federal competition

Christian Baretti, Robert Fenge, Bernd Huber, Willi Leibfritz and Matthias Steinherr

in ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Abstract: The structure German fiscal federalism is subject of the study. It describes the extent to which the concept of federal competition can be implemented in a system that up to has had a largely co-operative orientation. The study examines both the relationship between the federal government and the Länder and that of the Länder among themselves. It looks especially at the economic conditions that must be fulfilled so that federal competition does not lead to a permanent widening of the gap between Länder. The study examines the fiscal equalisation system, the current division of responsibilities among the federal, Länder and municipal levels as well as the prospects for an independent tax policy of the Länder. The analysis is based on the theory of fiscal federalism, on the experience of other federal systems (USA, Canada, Switzerland) as well as on empirical analyses (regressions of panel data, descriptive evaluations, etc.).

JEL-codes: C23 H72 H77 O47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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