Non-cooperative games with many players

M. Khan and Yeneng Sun (matsuny@nus.edu.sg)

Chapter 46 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2002, vol. 3, pp 1761-1808 from Elsevier

Abstract: In this survey article, we report results on the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with an atomless continuum of players, each with an action set that is not necessarily finite. We also discuss purification and symmetrization of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and settings in which private information, anonymity and idiosyncratic shocks are given particular prominence.

JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (81)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players (2002)
Working Paper: Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players (2000)
Working Paper: Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players (1996)
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