Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players

A. Khan and Yeneng Sun ()

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: In this survey article, we report results on the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with an atomless continuum of players, each with an action set that is not necessarily finite. We also discuss purification and symmetrization of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and settings in which private information, anonymity and idiosyncratic shocks are given particular prominence.

Keywords: GAMES; STRATEGIC PLANNING; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Chapter: Non-cooperative games with many players (2002)
Working Paper: Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players (2002)
Working Paper: Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:2000.80

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) France; Universite de Paris I - Pantheon- Sorbonne, 12 Place de Pantheon-75005 Paris, France. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().