Behavioral antitrust

Stephen Martin ()

Chapter 15 in Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization, 2018, pp 404-454 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter reviews the rational economic man model and contrasts it with evidence of bounded rationality that has emerged since the last quarter of the previous century. It discusses the implications of bounded rationality for research in industrial economics, with particular attention to the analysis of predation, collusion and entry. It concludes by drawing implications for the antitrust rules toward dominant firm behavior that come out of the Matsushita and Brooke Group decisions.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Behavioral Antitrust (2017)
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