TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperation

Jingang Zhao

Chapter 14 in Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, 2018, pp 392-422 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter surveys existing results and lists nine future areas in the field of transferable utility (TU) oligopoly games, which are both theoretically interesting and empirically important. On the theory side, they make advances on the refinements and applications of the core, one of the most important solutions in cooperative game theory. On the empirical side, TU oligopoly games allow one to model and analyze industrial cooperation and help understand the forces behind industrial changes as well as the effects of regulatory policies.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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