Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I

Edited by Luis Corchon and Marco Marini

in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
ISBN: 9781785363276
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

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Chapters in this book:

Ch 1 Introduction , pp 1-6

Luis Corchon and Marco Marini

Ch 2 Strategic complementarities in oligopoly , pp 9-39

Xavier Vives

Ch 3 On the Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies and the theory of supermodular games , pp 40-65

Rabah Amir

Ch 4 Aggregative games , pp 66-92

Martin Jensen

Ch 5 Monopolistic competition without apology , pp 93-136

Jacques Thisse and Philip Ushchev

Ch 6 Oligopoly and product differentiation , pp 137-180

Jean Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola

Ch 7 Oligopolistic competition and welfare , pp 181-200

Robert Ritz

Ch 8 Dynamic games , pp 203-228

Klaus Ritzberger

Ch 9 Strategic refinements , pp 229-260

Carlos Pimienta

Ch 10 Stackelberg games , pp 261-311

Ludovic Julien

Ch 11 Entry games and free entry equilibria , pp 312-342

Michele Polo

Ch 12 Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive players , pp 343-370

Gian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi

Ch 13 Coalitions and networks in oligopolies , pp 373-391

Francis Bloch

Ch 14 TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperation , pp 392-422

Jingang Zhao

Ch 15 Trading under asymmetric information: Positive and normative implications , pp 425-452

Andrea Attar and Claude d’Aspremont

Ch 16 Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions , pp 453-485

Ines Macho-Stadler and David Perez-Castrillo

Ch 17 Learning in markets , pp 486-519

Amparo Urbano

Ch 18 Information sharing in oligopoly , pp 520-536

Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri

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