Strategic complementarities in oligopoly
Xavier Vives
Chapter 2 in Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, 2018, pp 9-39 from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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