Transport pricing beyond the social optimum
Erik Verhoef
Chapter 3 in Handbook on Transport Pricing and Financing, 2023, pp 39-58 from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
This chapter reviews the theory of transport pricing under different objectives than the textbook references of first-best optimization of social welfare. We will discuss pricing for profit maximization, pricing by multiple governments, and - albeit briefly - price incentives that are constrained to be positive or budget neutral. Although different objectives naturally lead to different pricing rules, there remain strong conceptual links with insights from the theory of first-best pricing. For example, a profit-maximizing operator has an incentive to internalize congestion externalities, while an extensive example of tax competition produces pricing rules that balance elements from surplus maximizing and profit-maximizing pricing.
Keywords: Economics and Finance; Environment; Geography; Politics and Public Policy Urban and Regional Studies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781800375550/9781800375550.00009.xml (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Temporarily Unavailable
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:20184_3
Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com
Access Statistics for this chapter
More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Darrel McCalla ().