Strategic voting

Aaron Hamlin, Whitney Hua and Raquel Centeno

Chapter 108 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 769-775 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter defines various kinds of strategic voting and explores the conditions where it occurs. It overviews theoretical frameworks, categorizing them into (1) structural explanations focusing on electoral systems and voting methods, and (2) actor-based explanations examining individual decision-making. By showing how different voting methods influence voter behavior, the chapter illustrates strategic voting's impact on representation. It also raises the question of whether voting method accuracy at the aggregate level is a more important focus. Finally, the chapter identifies areas where future research may inform how to mitigate the effects of strategic voting.

Keywords: Strategic Voting; Electoral Systems; Voting Behavior; Tactical Voting; Duverger's law; Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/doi/10.4337/9781802207750.00113 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:21298_108

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jack Sweeney ().