Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice
Edited by Richard Jong-A-Pin and
Christian Bjørnskov
in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
This definitive Encyclopedia explores the core ideas of public choice theory, including rational choice, voting theory, and political budget cycles. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, entries cover both empirical, theoretical, and philosophical principles in the field. They explore how political incentives, institutional constraints, and voter behavior interact in contexts ranging from collective action, to democratic backsliding, to fiscal federalism and rent-seeking.
Keywords: Public Choice Theory; Rational Choice; Government Failure; Political Economy; Collective Action; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Chapters in this book:
- Ch 1 Abstention
- François Facchini and Louis Jaeck
- Ch 2 Affect in public choice
- Frans van Winden
- Ch 3 Algorithmic fairness
- John Patty and Elizabeth Maggie Penn
- Ch 4 Anarchy and public choice
- Peter T. Leeson
- Ch 5 Apartheid
- Art Carden and Christopher Lingle
- Ch 6 Are voters informed and rational?
- Donald Wittman
- Ch 7 Arrow's theorem and voting rules
- Nicholas R. Miller
- Ch 8 Attitudes toward globalization
- Philipp Harms and Nils D. Steiner
- Ch 9 Baumol's cost disease and Leviathan
- Otto Brøns-Petersen
- Ch 10 Beauty in politics
- Niclas Berggren, Henrik Jordahl and Panu Poutvaara
- Ch 11 Behavioral symmetry
- Cameron Tilley, Geoffrey Brennan and Michael Munger
- Ch 12 Belief consumption
- Christian Schubert and Jan Schnellenbach
- Ch 13 By-product firms
- Paul Pecorino
- Ch 14 Candidates’ positions in deterministic multidimensional models
- Maria Gallego
- Ch 15 Candidates’ positions in probabilistic multidimensional policy models
- Maria Gallego
- Ch 16 Candidates’ positions in multidimensional valence models
- Maria Gallego
- Ch 17 Capitalism
- Art Carden and Ilia Murtazashvili
- Ch 18 Central bank independence
- Jakob de Haan
- Ch 19 Checks and balances in socialist countries
- Yang Zhou
- Ch 20 Coase theorem
- Randall G. Holcombe
- Ch 21 Coercion
- Art Carden, John Meadowcroft and Ilia Murtazashvili
- Ch 22 Competition (antitrust) policy
- William F. Shughart
- Ch 23 Consequences of globalization
- Niklas Potrafke and Jan-Egbert Sturm
- Ch 24 Constitutional political economy
- Georg Vanberg
- Ch 25 Corruption as a problem in public choice
- Susan Rose-Ackerman
- Ch 26 Covering and the uncovered set
- Nicholas R. Miller
- Ch 27 Decline of democracy? Part 1
- Ronald Wintrobe
- Ch 28 Decline of democracy? Part 2
- Ronald Wintrobe
- Ch 29 Democracy and the quality of institutions
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon
- Ch 30 Democratic quality and population health
- Alberto Batinti and Joan Costa-Font
- Ch 31 Democratization and the threat of revolution
- Toke S. Aidt and Raphaël Franck
- Ch 32 Development policy
- Andreas Freytag and Moritz Wolf
- Ch 33 Direct democracy
- John G. Matsusaka
- Ch 34 A dividend of democracy
- Thomas Markussen and Jean-Robert Tyran
- Ch 35 Duverger's law and the seat product model
- Nicholas R. Miller
- Ch 36 Economic freedom
- Jakob de Haan and Jan-Egbert Sturm
- Ch 37 The economic model of man
- Martin Paldam
- Ch 38 Elections and norms of behaviour
- Marco Giani and Pierre-Guillaume Méon
- Ch 39 Electoral engineering
- Uğurcan Evci and Marek M. Kaminski
- Ch 40 Elinor Ostrom
- Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
- Ch 41 Expressive choice
- Colin Jennings
- Ch 42 Females as policymakers
- Monika Köppl-Turyna
- Ch 43 Finance and income inequality
- Jakob de Haan, Regina Pleninger and Jan-Egbert Sturm
- Ch 44 Fiscal equalization
- Monika Köppl-Turyna
- Ch 45 Fiscal federalism
- Christoph A. Schaltegger and Marco Portmann
- Ch 46 Foreign influence
- Toke S. Aidt, Facundo Albornoz and Esther Hauk
- Ch 47 Government failure as failure of the market for politics
- Reiner Eichenberger and David Stadelmann
- Ch 48 Government propaganda
- Christopher J. Coyne and Yahya Alshamy
- Ch 49 Grease-the-wheels hypothesis
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon
- Ch 50 Group size paradox
- Paul Pecorino
- Ch 51 Informal or shadow economy
- Friedrich Schneider
- Ch 52 Information in rent-seeking contests
- Lambert Schoonbeek
- Ch 53 Institutions and economic growth
- Francisco José Veiga
- Ch 54 International currency
- Carsten Hefeker
- Ch 55 International humanitarian aid
- Andreas Fuchs and Samuel Siewers
- Ch 56 Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
- Piotr Swistak
- Ch 57 Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
- Piotr Swistak
- Ch 58 Measures of corruption
- Nadia Fiorino and Emma Galli
- Ch 59 Measuring electoral competitiveness
- Stanley L. Winer
- Ch 60 Measuring electoral competitiveness
- Stanley L. Winer
- Ch 61 Measuring democracy
- Tommy Krieger
- Ch 62 The median voter model
- Roger D. Congleton
- Ch 63 Methodological individualism
- Cameron Tilley and Michael Munger
- Ch 64 Military-industrial complex
- Christopher J. Coyne and Nathan P. Goodman
- Ch 65 Mixed electoral systems
- Jarosław Flis, Marek M. Kaminski and Jeremiasz Salamon
- Ch 66 Nonviolent action
- Joshua Ammons and Christopher J. Coyne
- Ch 67 Outcomes of partisan politics
- Klaus Gründler, Niklas Potrafke and Cameron A. Shelton
- Ch 68 Partisan gerrymandering
- Bernard Grofman and Jonathan Cervas
- Ch 69 Paying “cash-for-votes”
- Anand Murugesan and Jean-Robert Tyran
- Ch 70 Political budget cycles
- Frank Bohn, Lamar Crombach and Jan-Egbert Sturm
- Ch 71 Political budget cycles
- Jakob de Haan and Bram Gootjes
- Ch 72 Political budget cycles
- Francisco José Veiga and Linda Gonçalves Veiga
- Ch 73 Political budget cycles
- Lamar Crombach, Frank Bohn and Jan-Egbert Sturm
- Ch 74 Peer effects and social contagion
- Thomas Apolte and Kim Leonie Kellermann
- Ch 75 Pocketbook voting
- Panu Poutvaara and Robert Schwager
- Ch 76 Political dynasties
- Maqsood Aslam and Etienne Farvaque
- Ch 77 Political economy of emerging donors
- Angelika Budjan and Axel Dreher
- Ch 78 Political economy of entrepreneurship policy
- Daniel L. Bennett
- Ch 79 Political economy of international sanctions
- Jerg Gutmann, Matthias Neuenkirch and Florian Neumeier
- Ch 80 Political fragmentation
- Jakob de Haan and Jan-Egbert Sturm
- Ch 81 Political legislation cycles
- Fabio Padovano
- Ch 82 Political economy of attention
- Patrick Balles, Ulrich Matter and Alois Stutzer
- Ch 83 Political ideology
- Maite Laméris and Richard Jong-A-Pin
- Ch 84 Politico-economic models
- Friedrich Schneider
- Ch 85 Politics as exchange
- Randall G. Holcombe
- Ch 86 Primacy effects
- Marek M. Kaminski and Steven Linder
- Ch 87 Prisoner's Dilemma
- Piotr Swistak
- Ch 88 Procyclical fiscal policy
- Toshihiro Ihori and Keigo Kameda
- Ch 89 Property rights and public choice
- Peter T. Leeson and Ennio E. Piano
- Ch 90 Public choice analysis of European integration
- Roland Vaubel
- Ch 91 Public choice and good governance
- Roger D. Congleton
- Ch 92 Public choice in the democracy of Ancient Athens
- George Tridimas
- Ch 93 Public debt
- François Facchini
- Ch 94 Public spending
- François Facchini
- Ch 95 Public choice and stadium subsidies
- John Charles Bradbury, Dennis Coates and Brad R. Humphreys
- Ch 96 Public health and public choice
- Peter T. Leeson and Henry A. Thompson
- Ch 97 Public sector efficiency
- Monika Köppl-Turyna
- Ch 98 Ratchet effect
- Christopher J. Coyne, Abigail R. Hall and Matthew A. Owens
- Ch 99 Relatively absolute absolutes
- Cameron Tilley and Michael Munger
- Ch 100 Rent seeking
- Kai A. Konrad
- Ch 101 Rise of authoritarian populism
- Ronald Wintrobe
- Ch 102 Secession as a public choice
- Martin Rode
- Ch 103 Shortsightedness effect
- Joseph Connors and James Gwartney
- Ch 104 Slavery
- Art Carden, Phillip W. Magness, John Meadowcroft and Ilia Murtazashvili
- Ch 105 Socialism
- Art Carden, Ilia Murtazashvili and Anna Claire Flowers
- Ch 106 Status quo
- Cameron Tilley and Michael Munger
- Ch 107 Strategic corporate environmentalism
- Pim Heijnen
- Ch 108 Strategic voting
- Aaron Hamlin, Whitney Hua and Raquel Centeno
- Ch 109 Suicide terrorism and martyrdom
- Mario Ferrero
- Ch 110 Theocracy
- Mario Ferrero
- Ch 111 Threshold public good games
- Pim Heijnen
- Ch 112 The transitional gains trap
- Art Carden and Sarah Moore
- Ch 113 Trust in financial institutions and central banks
- Carin van der Cruijsen and Anna Samarina
- Ch 114 Uncertainty and economic reforms
- Carsten Hefeker and Michael Neugart
- Ch 115 US Constitutional Convention
- Keith Dougherty and Ted Rossier
- Ch 116 US Electoral College
- Nicholas R. Miller
- Ch 117 Voting motives
- Panu Poutvaara and Robert Schwager
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