Covering and the uncovered set

Nicholas R. Miller

Chapter 26 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 181-186 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Given majority preference over a set of alternatives, x beats y if x is majority preferred to y and x covers y if x beats y and also beats every alternative that y beats. The uncovered set is the set of alternatives not covered by any other alternatives. It is a subset of both the top cycle set and the Pareto set. It includes every possible winning alternative given strategic voting under the amendment procedure. Complications arise when we allow for majority preference ties. In the context of spatial voting, the uncovered set can be bounded theoretically and approximately demarcated computationally.

Keywords: Covering; Uncovered set; Amendment procedure; Spatial voting; CyberSenate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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