Political legislation cycles

Fabio Padovano

Chapter 81 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 591-598 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Political legislation cycle theory predicts that legislators maximize their re-election probabilities by approving laws in the interest of voters before the elections and satisfying lobbies’ demands at the beginning of legislatures. Discrimination in time and visibility of the legislative instruments adopted minimizes the electoral costs of satisfying lobbies’ interests. Legislative cycles provide a quantitative indicator of an electorally induced inefficiency in the relationship between voters and politicians, more general than budget cycles, as they encompass all forms of redistribution. Empirical tests, both in single countries and in comparative settings, aimed at uncovering the institutional determinants of legislative cycles, are illustrated.

Keywords: Political legislation cycles; Economic theory of legislation; Lack of political accountability; Comparative institutional analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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