Suicide terrorism and martyrdom

Mario Ferrero

Chapter 109 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 776-779 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter addresses the supply of suicide or martyr actions, terrorist or otherwise, and asks how voluntary self-sacrifice for a cause can be rational. A range of models ignore otherworldly motives and seek to encompass all kinds of self-sacrifice, religious or secular, collectively organized or self-directed, “good” or “bad,” in one framework. The theoretical toolkit used draws from the economics of contracts, the economics of identity, the club model of sects, principal-agent theory, and the Nash equilibrium of models of intergenerational altruism, voluntary contributions to a public good, and competition for fame or infamy.

Keywords: Self-sacrifice; Martyrdom contract; Decentralized terrorism; Cult of martyrs; Competition for notoriety; Economics of identity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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