Threshold public good games

Pim Heijnen

Chapter 111 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 786-790 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In threshold public good games with binary contributions, the public good is provided if and only if the number of contributions exceeds a given threshold. The equilibrium of this game and its properties are investigated. Specifically, it is demonstrated that the probability that the public good is provided at all decreases with the number of players. The link to a particular voting paradox, where an increase in the number of supporters of a candidate can reduce their chance of winning an election, is explored.

Keywords: Public good; Binary contribution; Threshold; Bystander effect; Voting paradoxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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