Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Piotr Swistak

Chapter 56 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 399-402 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Real-life instances of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game occur in an iterated (IPD) rather than a one-shot form. But, as opposed to the one-shot PD, equilibria in the iterated game depend on the details of the game's specification. For instance, in an IPD defined as a finite game where the game's length is common knowledge, there is a single inefficient equilibrium (just like in the one-shot PD). Inefficient equilibria also obtain in IPDs defined as discounted games with an indefinite horizon when players heavily discount future payoffs. This structure of equilibria changes dramatically in IPDs where players care about future payoffs.

Keywords: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma’; Finite iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma’; Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with indefinite horizon’; Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with discounting’; Infinite iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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