Belief consumption

Christian Schubert and Jan Schnellenbach

Chapter 12 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 86-92 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In a market environment, we normally expect individuals to value beliefs according to their instrumental usefulness in attaining economic goals. Biased beliefs may occur at the individual level, but competition punishes those who hold false beliefs. This is different in the political arena, where individuals act behind a veil of insignificance that allows them to consume beliefs for their psychological or social value. If this occurs on a large scale, collective decision-making can be biased. It can, for example, focus on some notion of the common good instead of special interests. It can, however, also lead to inefficient and even catastrophic policy-making traps.

Keywords: Expressive behavior; Beliefs; Policy traps; Rational irrationality; Collective biases (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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