Political budget cycles

Jakob de Haan and Bram Gootjes

Chapter 71 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 501-512 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Political budget cycle (PBC) research examines election cycles in public spending, taxes, and budget deficits. Current research asks not whether but under what circumstances a PBC is likely to occur. This chapter takes stock of this literature, identifying which conditioning factors have been examined. It seems that PBCs are larger and more frequent in developing countries, but many papers show that PBCs also occur in advanced economies. In younger democracies, a PBC is more likely to occur and is more likely to be stronger than in more mature democracies. It is not clear what mechanism is responsible for these findings.

Keywords: Fiscal policy; Elections; Political budget cycle; Conditioning effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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