Central bank independence

Jakob de Haan

Chapter 18 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 128-133 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Central bank independence refers to the absence of influence of politicians on monetary policymaking. Theory predicts that countries with an independent and “conservative” (inflation-averse) central bank will have lower inflation than those in which monetary policy is controlled by the government. Most empirical evidence supports this prediction. Still, since the Global Financial Crisis, the concept of an independent central bank has increasingly been questioned. It is widely believed that more independent central banks should be accountable. Despite the widespread support for the notion of central bank accountability, there is no consensus in the literature about its precise definition.

Keywords: Central bank; Independence; Inflation; Accountability; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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