Behavioral symmetry

Cameron Tilley, Geoffrey Brennan and Michael Munger

Chapter 11 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 81-85 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: When the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economics went to James M. Buchanan, BBC 4's Alistair Cooke—in his “Letter from America”—said: “Public Choice rests on the homely but important observation that politicians are, after all, no different than the rest of us.” This statement captures one of the underlying pillars of public choice. That is when modeling human behavior, the same assumptions should be made whether that person is acting in market or political institutions. People should be modeled as primarily self-interested individuals.

Keywords: Motivational Symmetry; Institutional Analysis; Rational Choice Theory; Benevolent Despot; Self-Interest; Political Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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