Candidates’ positions in probabilistic multidimensional policy models

Maria Gallego

Chapter 15 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 107-114 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Multidimensional policy party positioning models are surveyed where candidates have incomplete information about voters’ preferences that depend on policies and a partisan bias unobserved by candidates. In equilibrium, candidates locate at a centrist utilitarian point, the weighted mean of voters’ utilities, where the weight is the density of voters’ biases when indifferent between candidates. If biases at indifference are symmetric, candidates locate at the unweighted sum of voters’ utilities. Under quadratic utilities, the utilitarian optimum corresponds to the mean of voters’ ideal points. By locating at the utilitarian optimum, candidates are indistinguishable, leading voters to choose candidates in an equiprobable manner.

Keywords: Party positioning; Probabilistic voting; Utilitarian point (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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