Politico-economic models

Friedrich Schneider

Chapter 84 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 613-618 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter provides an overview of some selected areas of economic theory of politics (public choice). Politico-economic models are concerned with the interaction between politics and economics and analyze relationships between voters, government, the central bank, and interest groups. One major result from studies of these models is that politicians are often motivated by self-interest; for example, they may attempt to secure re-election by applying expansionary economic policy measures before elections. Public choice analysis has been widened to cover other aspects, such as international organizations, and direct investment in developing countries is influenced by political and economic factors.

Keywords: Political budget cycles; Public choice; Economic theory of politics; Politico-economic model; Government; Voters; Interest groups; International political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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