Pocketbook voting

Panu Poutvaara and Robert Schwager

Chapter 75 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 538-547 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Economic theory predicts that voters tend to vote for the candidate or political party whose expected policies benefit them most financially. Median voter and probabilistic voting models assume that election promises are binding, and voters are prospective. In sanctioning and selection models of post-election politics, instead, voters are retrospective and vote based on implemented policies. While early empirical tests of pocketbook voting resulted in mixed evidence, more recent literature on reforms and policy proposals that allow for causal identification and on referenda has found strong support for it. The literature remains divided on whether pocketbook voting is primarily prospective or retrospective.

Keywords: Economic voting; Median voter; Probabilistic voting; Sanctioning and selection models; Prospective voting; Retrospective voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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