Are voters informed and rational?

Donald Wittman

Chapter 6 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 37-44 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Are voters informed and rational, or are they (rationally) uninformed and misled by biased information? And what difference does the answer make for election outcomes? These questions have been raised and answered in three different ways by those in public choice: psychological (behavioral economics), sociological (information monopoly), and economic (competition and voter rationality). This chapter surveys the relevant literature and critically assesses the theoretical and empirical strengths and weaknesses of each approach.

Keywords: Elections; Rational Voters; Information; Expressive Voting; Median Voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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