Political dynasties

Maqsood Aslam and Etienne Farvaque

Chapter 76 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 548-552 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter provides a survey of the literature on political dynasties. We first detail the mechanisms through which dynasties can emerge, entrench their power, and survive. We separate the demand-side factors (i.e., why voters could favor dynastic politicians?) from the supply side determinants (i.e., the apparatuses through which politicians organize their dynastic succession). We then consider the advantages dynasties create for their members, first in terms of political competition and second in economic terms. We finally discuss dynasties that are not found in the political arena and ponder if and how one could limit the dynastic grip on the political system. JEL-codes: D02, D72, D73, P16

Keywords: Dynasties; Electoral rules; Electoral competition; Nepotism; Favoritism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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