Information in rent-seeking contests

Lambert Schoonbeek

Chapter 52 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 369-373 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: We examine equilibrium of the seminal Tullock rent-seeking contest in cases where players do not have complete information about the valuation of the contested rent. We focus on equilibrium existence and uniqueness. We consider cases with incomplete information, one-sided asymmetric information, signaling, and information disclosure.

Keywords: Tullock contest; Rent-seeking; Incomplete information; Rent-seeking; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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